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1. Introduction
Dan Zahavi’s Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame is
an elaboration of the author’s phenomenological account of selfhood, the
latest longer work in a series of publications on the topic. e focus of this
monograph is on the relation between the self and the other. Zahavi defends
the multidimensional model of the self and argues that the minimal self, the
most basic form of self that all subjective creatures share, is presocial. How-
ever, there are also other dimensions of the self that are formed through so-
cial means. Self and Other is an exploration of the interconnection between
the social and the presocial aspects of selfhood via an extended investigation
of the phenomenon of empathy. It addresses the question whether under-
standing the self to be a presocial and rst-personal phenomenon at themost
basic level allows for a proper account of both intersubjectivity and the social
nature of humans. Drawing upon insights provided by the phenomenologi-
cal accounts of Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Max Scheler, and Alfred Schutz, Zahavi defends the notion of a minimal
self from the critique that it is overly Cartesian. He argues that since the
basic form of empathy, which is necessary for developing any social dimen-
sion of selfhood, entails the preservation of self-other dierentiation, the
rst-personal experiential self must rather be regarded as a prerequisite for
a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity and sociability. e monograph
includes a critical assessment of a wide range of contemporary works on the
self, empathy, and shame, and it engages with relevant recent discoveries in
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the cognitive sciences, bringing together research in phenomenology, ana-
lytical philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience. One of its central
goals is to show that the phenomenological method is not outdated and can
provide important insights that are of use to contemporary research on self-
hood and sociability.
2. Subjectivity and selfhood
e book is divided thematically into three parts, the last of which suggests
some future directions for research. I will focus on the two more substantial
parts in this review: the chapters on the self and the chapters on empathy.
e rst section of the book is dedicated to explaining what the minimal or
experiential self is and why one should adopt the view that it exists. Fol-
lowing the phenomenological tradition, Zahavi argues that every instance
of experience involves an inherent aspect of “mine-ness” or “for-me-ness”
and this constitutes a minimal self. A state is a conscious state in virtue of
making a dierence to what it is like for me.
is, Zahavi admits, has led many of his readers to believe that the ex-
periential self or experiential subjectivity (Zahavi uses the two terms inter-
changeably) must have a specic feel to it or that there is such a thing as
“I-qualia”. It has been seen as a problem for a phenomenological account of
minimal self. In the currentmonograph Zahavi rejects a critique along these
lines by insisting that instead of thinking of the mine-ness of experience as
something on a par with the scent of freshly crushed mint leaves, we should
understand it as the manner or the how of experiencing. My experiences do
not have mine-ness as their content, but it is a part of their structure that I
have them minely. What really distinguishes my experiential life from that
of others’ is not any content of my experience but the way it is given to me,
namely, that it is given “rst-personally”.
is clarication of Zahavi’s viewmakes it look quite similar to accounts
that take the mine-ness of experience to be a mere metaphysical relation
rather than something experiential.e divergence of the two sorts of views
could have been presented with more clarity and detail. What Zahavi has
in mind might perhaps be better understood when we consider what is lost
in schizophrenia. Following a tradition that started with John Campbell’s
paper (1999) (cited in Zahavi 2014), Zahavi points out that there are two
kinds of mine-ness in experience: the recognition of an experience belong-
ing to one’s own mental life and the recognition of oneself as the author of
a thought. Zahavi discusses schizophrenia in order to show that thought-
insertion pathology does not involve the loss of ownership, but rather the
loss of the experience of authorship. Indeed, the fact that the person retains
the rst kind of mine-ness is precisely the reason why a conict can arise
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within him. He feels that the alien thoughts are not ‘over there’ but in his
mental life and he is disturbed by it.
ough Zahavi does not take this step, the same example could be used
to show that a merely metaphysical account of the minimal self is mislead-
ing. If mine-ness as ownership would not make a dierence in experience
at all, it would follow that no conict could arise in the schizophrenia case
and that a person could not suer from any such form of schizophrenia. Za-
havi argues that the subjectivity or ownership of experience amounts to a
minimal form of self, and thus the self makes an experiential dierence. If
one reads Zahavi’s text in this way, there may seem to be a tension in his
account—namely, that for a reader coming from the analytic tradition like
myself, it may remain vague as to how the self can make an experiential dif-
ference without becoming an object of experience; how something can be
experienced without being what is experienced. I presume that the phe-
nomenological answer would be that rst-personal character of experience
is a part of the structure of that experience, much like memory, perception,
and imagination are structurally distinct. It does seem plausible that recol-
lecting an object makes a dierence to my experience relative to perceiving
an object, for instance. Yet, recollection is not an object of active experience.
Zahavi is explicit about the limitations of the phenomenological account
of self.e minimal self does not come close to capturing the complex phe-
nomenon of selfhood. Instead, Zahavi wants to demonstrate the complexity
of the phenomenon and show that many of the accounts that have been seen
as competing denitions of the self are actually accounts of dierent dimen-
sions of selfhood. One of the central themes for the rest of the book is the
investigation of the relation between the social and non-social aspects of
selfhood.
3. Empathy
In part II, Zahavi investigates the rich and controversial research in empa-
thy. Although interest in empathy is growing in many elds including phi-
losophy, psychology, and neuroscience, there is a long on-going debate con-
cerning what exactly empathy is and consensus does not seem forthcom-
ing. ‘Empathy’ is a term used to mean dierent things in dierent contexts
in scientic and philosophical inquiry, as well as in everyday life. is has
started a debate over which process(es) qualify as empathy proper. As with
selfhood, Zahavi’s aim is not to contribute to the terminological dispute by
limiting empathy to a single phenomenon. Nor is his goal to provide an ac-
count that covers the full range of interpersonal understanding. Instead, his
aim is to demonstrate that the phenomenological investigations of empathy
can provide insights that are relevant to contemporary research as well as to
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show that acceptance of the rst-personal character of experience as an es-
sential aspect of selfhood does not preclude the possibility of a satisfactory
account of intersubjectivity. e core of part II is chapter 10, in which Za-
havi introduces and interprets several phenomenological approaches to em-
pathy. He argues that despite important dierences, there is enough overlap
between the theories presented to talk about something like a phenomeno-
logical account of empathy.is phenomenological account emphasizes the
importance of a basic level of empathy, which has not been given much at-
tention in today’s research. Contemporary study of empathy has mainly fo-
cused upon the processes that allow us both to explain and predict others’
behaviour and to act socially.e phenomenological account, on the other
hand, is also concerned with explaining how we come to experience others
asminded beings, or howwe come to have basic empathy. One of the central
insights that the phenomenological account provides is an emphasis on the
asymmetry between the way one’s own experiences are given to one and the
way one can be acquainted with the experiences of another. Whereas the
experience of empathy is given to one rst-personally, the experiences that
one empathizes with are not.us, in order to preserve the otherness of the
other and not reduce the other to oneself, the rst-personal character of the
minimal self is essential. Indeed, the experiential dimension of selfhood is
presupposed by phenomenological empathy.
In addition to the phenomenological theory of basic empathy, Zahavi
also presents and defends a phenomenological account of empathy which
is insightful, he argues, in that it brings into light a pre-reective aspect of
empathy that does not involve any form of inference, perspective taking,
nor projection. Indeed, most theories of empathy in philosophy assume
that empathizing involves some form of conscious eort and mindreading.
Furthermore, the phenomenological form of empathy does not entail the
sharing or matching of emotions. On this account, for one to be empathi-
cally acquainted with a friend’s love or frustration, does not mean to share
those emotions. In contemporary research—with the exception of the term
‘cognitive empathy’ sometimes used in psychology (see e.g. Smith 2009)—it
is normally assumed that empathy includes both a cognitive aspect and an
emotional or experiential aspect and is treated as an ability not just to grasp
but also to catch another’s experience (see e.g. Coplan 2011; De Vignemont
and Singer 2006; Goldie 2000; Snow 2000). On the one hand, Zahavi wants
to avoid positing the catching condition, but on the other hand, he alsowants
to retain the idea that empathy is experiential. He argues that cases where we
react with fear when seeing that the other is angry should count as instances
of empathy and that mainstream accounts that place such reactions on a par
with cases of mindreading followed by an emotional reaction are misguided
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(149). However, on the phenomenological account, it is not the emotional
reaction itself that makes it a case of empathy but the direct face-to-face ac-
quaintance with another’s emotion. What is characteristic of empathy, in
other words, is only the way another’s mind is given to me—that I am seeing
rather than imagining it. us, we can also empathise with beliefs, inten-
tions and other cognitive states (151). So, what Zahavi means when he says
that empathy is experiential is very dierent from what is usually meant in
empathy research. According to both treatments, the experiential aspect is
meant to set empathy apart from mindreading but in very dierent ways.
Given the mainstream view, to empathise is to experience what others ex-
perience. Zahavi, however, speaks of empathy as a non-inferential ability to
attribute mental states to others. As such, his account of empathy ts seam-
lessly into the debate about how we attribute mental states to other agents
while it ts into the contemporary debates about the nature and function of
empathy in a way that seems much more forced.
I am very sympathetic towards Zahavi’s ambition to defend the multidi-
mensional nature of selfhood and interpersonal understanding. I nd this
direction particularly important in the context of philosophical research on
empathy, where the focus has been on providing a denition of real em-
pathy, while very little justication for preferring any given denition has
been provided.is has created amisleading impression that most accounts
of empathy are incompatible and compete with each other, prohibiting any
real collaboration between philosophers who work in this eld. I agree with
Zahavi in that recognizing the complexity and layered nature of our social-
ity is essential to empathy and social cognition research. However, some
accounts of empathy or self surely may still compete with each other. Za-
havi dierentiates between at least two levels of empathy: basic empathy
and pre-reective empathy (169), but he refers to many phenomena that are
oen called ‘empathy’ in contemporary empathy research as mere forms of
interpersonal understanding but never as empathy. I believe that Zahavi’s
account would have gained in both clarity and insightfulness if he hadmade
it clearer what composes the conict between any two accounts of selfhood
or empathy and what makes something a case of empathy as opposed to a
form of interpersonal understanding that is not empathy. From what is said
in the book, I gather that in Zahavi’s view empathy always requires face-to-
face acquaintance with the target person, while other forms of interpersonal
understanding do not.is, however, calls for a major revision of terminol-
ogy in the eld and a rethinking of what empathy is. us, while Zahavi
wishes to avoid entering the debate about what the term ‘empathy’ means,
he nevertheless seems to have entered it.
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4. Conclusion
e book addresses a wide range of objections to anti-realism about the self
in general as well as to the notion of a minimal self and its importance for
understanding intersubjectivity. Zahavi demonstrates that his account of the
experiential self can avoid many of the problems that have led researchers to
abandon the notion of self altogether, and he does so by intertwining the
phenomenological approach with ndings in contemporary scientic re-
search. e fruits of extensive research in the eld are presented, and an
impressive number of relevant theories and research results are introduced.
As such, the book serves as a comprehensive, albeit somewhat hectic, guide
to the discussed themes, and as an introductory text to the eld. However,
its richness comes with a price, and the wide variety of views presented is so
vast that it distracts the reader, making it oen needlessly hard to follow the
main argument. Additionally, some connections between presented theo-
ries are drawn rather loosely and some theories that are touched upon do
not directly contribute to the arguments. is results in the book coming
across as somewhat unfocused.e book would have beneted from some
more space spent clarifying Zahavi’s own positions in a way that is more
proportional to the lengthy discussion of other views.
ese remarks aside, Zahavi’s Self and Other contains an extensive over-
view of the issues concerning the sociality of the self and brings to light the
ways that phenomenological methods can enrich the current philosophical
and scientic research of selfhood and empathy. In contrast to the majority
of philosophical work on these subjects, Zahavi stresses the need to recog-
nize the layered nature of these phenomena, which I see as a great method-
ological virtue of his work. We have, for a long time, also lacked a much
needed comprehensive overview of the relations between dierent accounts
of empathy which the book provides. e text has much worth both as an
original piece of philosophy and as a piece of secondary literature for those
who want to familiarize themselves with research on selfhood and intersub-
jectivity.
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